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Since the sixteenth century, ‘utopia’ has named the place which is not a place, which is also a 
good place, or a way of thinking what a good place could be, if one existed. Emerging from 
European voyages of conquest and discovery, and predicated on a coloniser’s vision of empty 
spaces which could be filled with good societies, utopian desires shifted during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries to focus on desirable future societies, rather than remote islands (More 
1965 [1516]; Marin 1993; Houston 2016). As the term is used in contemporary social theory, 
utopia refers to imaginary visions of good societies, real-world attempts to carry out such 
schemes, and the more inchoate longing that things could be different involved in everyday 
activities like daydreaming, engagement with works of art and shopping (Levitas 2007; 
Beaumont 2006; Maclaran 1998; Badot and Filser 2007). Utopia is also often invoked to 
criticise simplistic and totalising schemes which have disastrous consequences, especially the 
transformative projects of revolutionary and Messianic movements (Gray 2007).   
Just a few years ago, even defenders of utopia wrote with the assumption that the concept 
was at best embattled and at worst dead, except when it was promoted from the political centre. 
By the mid-2000s major utopian schemes were considered post-ideological and pragmatic; as 
one scholar who sought to assert the value of utopian hope lamented, more than ever we have 
become narrow utilitarians dedicated to fixing, not reinventing, the here and now” (Gray 2008; 
Jacoby 2005, p. ix). These arguments are consistent with a wider vein of criticism according 
to which it has become increasingly difficult to entertain really different imaginations of the 
future, except in terms of catastrophe (Fisher 2009, Jameson 2003). But over the past few years 
a reinvigorated utopianism has reappeared across the political spectrum. From the left, a 
number of popular books with titles like Inventing the Future, Four Futures, and Utopia for 
Realists, have sought to rekindle utopian aspirations by imagining how new technological 
developments could be deployed for social benefit (Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bregman 
2017; Frase 2016). Among libertarians, discussions of Sea-Steading, the construction of 
floating communities in order to escape the constraints of the nation state, have a powerfully 
utopian outlook (Friedman and Taylor 2012). And populist political projects, including the 
administration of Donald Trump in the US and the UK’s vote to leave the European Union, 
have also been interpreted as possessing powerful utopian dimensions (Hitchcock 2016; De 
Cock, Just and Husted 2018; Guldi 2017). 
Many recent utopian visions draw inspiration from the histories of science and 
technology. Calls for a mass mobilization in response to climate emergency, for example, 
invoke the experience of the Home Front during World War Two, including the enrolment of 
science (Climate Mobilization 2018). One of the strategists responsible for delivering the 
Brexit vote has speculated extensively on the prospect of remodelling the British civil service 
along the lines of NASA and DARPA; arguments which are based on the eclectic readings of 
histories of science and technology (Cummings 2018). Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek’s 
manifesto Inventing the Future, which tries to imagine how wide scale automation might be 
redirected for socially progressive purposes, gives a lengthy discussion of Project Cybersyn, 
the Allende regime’s attempt to introduce a socialist version of cybernetics to 1970s Chile, 
which they learned about from the historian of science Eden Medina’s book Cybernetic 
Revolutionaries (Williams and Srnicek 2015, pps 148-150; Medina 2011). In all these 
accounts, the scientific and technological past is presented as a resource from which future 
political struggle could draw inspiration, or which can provide alternative forms and 
possibilities. 
These readings sit at odds with many of the positions and practicesof history and 
philosophy of science (HPS) and science and technology studies (STS). Scholars in these fields 
have a long-founded suspicion of utopianism, which they have regarded as simplistic, 
dangerously totalising, and limiting; I discuss these views in detail in the third section of this 
essay. Academic analysis of science and technology is supposed to take us beyond delusive 
fantasies and simplistic myths of progress which are often called utopian, allowing the 
cultivation of properly ambivalent responses and inclusive accounts which do not ascribe 
futurity to innovation alone (Segal 2005, pps 156-163, Nowotny 2010). The traditions of STS 
and HPS are also braided with utopian longings of their own, however: with desires to affirm 
different ways of knowing, modes of relation and understandings of ontology to mainstream 
claims made in scientifically advanced societies. Scholars including Karl Popper, Helga 
Nowotny, Otto Neurath, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, and Isabelle Stengers have critiqued 
what they consider bad utopian visions, but have also advanced their own visions of the good 
life, meaningful action and the possibility of change. Thus, to give one example, Latour usually 
talks about utopia to identify positions with which he disagrees. He opposes the separation of 
‘modern’ people's and their practices from those of other human groups, and he gives a story 
where agency is always distributed between humans and non-humans. As he remarks in a 
recent interview, “the absolute enemy is utopia” because it requires an imagination of pure, 
empty spaces, a view from nowhere, and the cultivation of purified categories (Latour, 
Stengers, Tsing, 2018, p. 592). But, as Lisa Garforth observes, with the same breath Latour 
also calls for “a new kind of civilization”, which is to be based on an “alternative narrative 
[…] of who we are which will allow us to “participate in a renegotiation of ‘what we might 
become’” (Garforth 2016, p. 104, citing Latour 2013, pps. 22, 16). These are different views 
of what utopia should be, but Latour is far from alone in wanting a more critical and processual 
view of utopian possibility. What is at stake is what Utopianism can mean, and how criticisms 
of other people’s bad dreaming constructs space for alternative visions to flourish. 
This essay undertakes to reconstruct the utopian perspectives of HPS and STS. It argues 
that for many scholars in both disciplines the scientific past has served as a critical counterpoint 
to the present, allowing challenges to the present-day social and technical orders. Many 
thinkers from HPS and STS have also, to different degrees at different historical moments, 
connected their scholarly work with the theory and practice of political struggle, and have 
sometimes tried to develop plans of possible futures. I argue that a critical engagement with 
these legacies can help to clarify the motivations and politics of HPS and STS by casting light 
on how scholars in these fields think about the place of epistemology and ontology in 
conceptualising alternate possibilities, solidarities, and violence, and in their uses of historical 
example and imaginative literature to envisage alternatives. Utopian visions and struggles—
and critical struggles with the notion of utopia—have not been abstract, but in many cases have 
responded to historical events and the failure of longed-for schemes.. The examples of 
utopianism found within the practices of STS and HPS which are discussed here do not connect 
straightforwardly with the examples of popular utopianism mentioned earlier in this 
introduction. But they suggest the hopes which inform analyses of other people’s utopias—the 
positive visions cherished by scholars in these fields. 
The structure is as follows. The second section poses a series of questions from the field 
of Utopian Studies, which open up the question of what is at stake in talking about utopia. The 
third section discusses some of the major approaches to the term ‘utopia’ in HPS and STS, 
discussing utopia as blueprint, as existing alternative (or ‘heterotopia’), as simplification, as 
performative tool, and as ethos. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections then explore three major 
utopian strands within HPS and STS: longings for integration in the face of knowledge which 
has become specialised and divorced from other aspects of existence; the dreams of planners 
that developing scientific knowledge could be brought under social control and redirected for 
socially useful purposes; and the threads of feminist analyses of science and technology, where 
these have been developed in utopian directions. The seventh section takes up the problem of 
Latour’s utopianism, examining both the utopian potentials and the strong anti-utopian 
currents of his thought. Finally, the eighth section draws some general lessons from the 
pervasive but often overlooked utopian traditions of HPS and STS. 
I discuss thinkers from both HPS and STS, paying particular attention to how they 
reconstruct versions of the past in order to imagine new ways of going forward in the present 
and future. HPS and STS are now in many respects different scholarly disciplines, with 
different methods and concerns. Their separation is, however, a recent phenomenon: in some 
institutions STS and HPS are taught and researched alongside each other, and there are 
historians who are also professors of STS (UCL STS 2019). Many important works of STS 
have been historical in character, and STS scholars like Latour and Haraway draw extensively 
on insights from histories of science, as well as writing historical studies of their own (Latour 
1987; Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Haraway 1989). STS practitioners appeal to the works of 
philosophers and historians as well as others from their own fields; HPS has periodically been 
invigorated by perspectives from STS as well (Golinski 1998). At the level of longing, struggle 
and dreaming, the primary focus of this essay, HPS and STS have often reached for one another 
and that is why they are discussed together here. 
Much recent discussion of utopia—both its importance and reasons to resist it—has been 
framed in terms of the Anthropocene, the putative geological epoch shaped by human activity 
(Hamilton 2016; Latour 2016; Bennett et al. 2015). Thinking through the transformative 
potentials and devastating tendencies of the Anthropocene has been central for the thinkers 
considered in the second half of this paper. In reconstructing the longer legacies of utopian 
thought and practice in HPS and STS, however, I have not prioritised the concerns of the 
present with the Anthropocene and what Latour terms the ‘New Climate Regime’ appearing 
as the obvious end-point for the other intellectual and political projects discussed here. The 
utopianism of HPS and STS has been more diverse than this framing would suggest. 
Finally, I do not talk about dystopia in this essay, even though visions of radically bad 
places have been important modes of challenging science and technology, and enjoy wide 
circulation (Feenburg 2012). The reason for this neglect is that utopian visions, critiques of 
utopia, and hopes and actions to bring about desirable change, all feed into each other: it is 
meaningful to talk about how utopian theory relates to utopian practice. The same is not usually 
true of dystopia. 
  
  
2. Questions from Utopian Studies 
  
The academic field of Utopian Studies considers utopian thought and practice through 
investigations of literature, real-world utopias, and a more wide-ranging inquiry into social 
practices of hope. Scholars have drawn particular inspiration from Ernst Bloch’s magnum 
opus The Principle of Hope, originally published in German between 1954 and 1959, and 
translated into English in 1986 (Bloch 1986 [1954])  Bloch detected utopian wishes in a wide 
range of everyday activities, from day-dreaming to aesthetic and religious experience. Most of 
these longings turned out in practice to be fantasies, but they could also be conceived as 
anticipatory of a different social and political order, in which alternative possibilities for 
flourishing were available. In Ruth Levitas’ summary, for Bloch “[t]he importance of Utopian 
wishes hinges on the unfinishedness of the material world. The world is in a constant state of 
process, of becoming. The future is ‘not yet’ and is a realm of possibility. Utopia reaches 
toward that future and anticipates it. And in so doing, it helps to effect the future” (Levitas 
1990, p. 14). Bloch conceived his recovery of past hopes in Marxist terms, emphasising the 
need to distinguish between idle fantasies and “concrete utopia”; he thus criticised the contents 
of many of the modes of hope which he discussed (Levitas 1990, Jameson 1974, p. 125). As 
Levitas observes, Bloch’s desire to separate productive struggles and wishes from merely 
fantastical ones is shared with many other theorists of utopia, and is central to the claim that 
utopia can get beyond dreaming and contribute to meaningful action—but the distinction 
isdifficult to ground epistemically (Levitas 1990, p. 13). Nevertheless, critiques of other 
people’s idle utopias can be a way to clarify one’s own visions of transformation. 
STS and HPS have engaged to a limited degree with Bloch’s work, with two collections 
giving fairly brief discussions of his contributions (Nowotny 1984, Kemperink and Vermeer 
2010). There is thus some work to do in clarifying how insights from Utopian Studies relate 
to the questions and concerns of these disciplines. It is beyond the scope of this essay to give 
an overview of the entire field, but the remainder of this section poses some questions 
suggested by utopian studies, which will help to focus our discussion of utopianism in STS 
and HPS. 
Does ‘utopia’ refer to a small subset of visions of alternatives, or can utopian desires 
be detected in political projects of all sorts? Karl Mannheim claimed that in democratic 
cultures, any explicit programme put forward by an opposition party can be considered 
utopian, in the sense that it challenges the established political order (Geoghegan 2004). 
Levitas argues that utopian scholars must explicate the visions of a good life implicit in all 
political programs, including those which identify as centrist or pragmatist, and contrast these 
with explicit proposals of their own (Levitas 2013, pps. 153-174). This expansive view of 
utopianism runs counter to the ways in which the term is often used, and risks treating all 
normative political programmes as utopian. On the other hand, a more restrictive definition of 
utopia risks presenting utopian hope as a sporadic eruption into the normal order of things, 
which can mystify the utopian presuppositions which underlie normal conditions.  In section 
three I pay close attention to some of the main ways in which HPS and STS scholars have used 
the term; the following sections present attempts from within these disciplines to imagine 
alternative possibilities. Again, these mainly involve explicit invocations of utopia, though 
some are resistant to the notion; I also try to keep in view the ways in which critics of utopia 
also advance their own accounts of flourishing. This is a comparatively small subset of the 
possible utopian visions which could be considered within HPS and STS: I do not talk about 
the utopian possibilities implicit in, for example, internalist histories of science or upstream 
science engagement, though each has hopes and visions of change which would certainly bear 
unpacking (Koyré 1968; Wilsdom and Willis 2004). This is a limitation, but has the advantage 
that I am able to discuss relatively reflective accounts of (and resistances to) utopianism. 
What activities and resources are used to construct utopias? Utopian Studies haspaid 
particular attention to works of imaginative literature, paying considerable attention to 
questions of literary form (Elliot 1970; Suvin 1973; Jameson 2005). It also investigates 
everyday spaces in which different ways of living are available, activities which involve 
longings for transcendence, or for things to be different (Levitas 2007; Cooper 2013). 
Scientific practices may be considered utopian in a number of senses: they can embody hope, 
or values and ways of relation which challenge habitual ways of acting.  
How does Utopian thought relate to other methods of imagining the future? While some 
utopias are located in the future and associated with notions of progress, many of them are not 
and in recent years much utopianism can be said to have abandoned the future (Garforth 2009). 
Nevertheless, utopian thought is closely associated with other attempts to construct desirable 
futures, for example through plans, manifestos and scenarios (Raven 2015; Weeks 2013). In 
section five, we will see how scholars who want to revive an ethos of planning but who are 
sceptical of modernist accounts have turned towards more reflexive modes of producing 
accounts of the future. Section six considers the important place which utopian science fiction 
has played in articulating accounts of science, and the turn in Donna Haraway’s recent work 
towards the construction of future scenarios. 
How are histories mobilised within accounts of utopia? A major trope of many accounts 
of utopia is that a tradition of hope and visions of meaningful change have been lost and which 
needs to be recovered. As part of this recuperation, scholars turn towards the past in order to 
salvage possibilities and to demonstrate that envisaged alternatives have played a meaningful 
role in history, even if they have been defeated or marginalised. Levitas, for example argues 
that around the turn twentieth century, writers including HG Wells, Edward Bellamy, William 
Morris and Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote utopian works which point towards a different 
image of how sociology can be imagined, with a utopian method at its centre. Such possibilities 
were displaced, according to Levitas, through the institutionalization of approaches which 
instead tried to present sociology as a mode of value-free scientific inquiry, and which 
disavowed its utopian connections (Levitas 2014, p. 91-98). This recovered tradition serves in 
part to legitimate Levitas’ own form of inquiry. In the third section of this essay, we will see 
how practitioners of HPS and STS turn to the past in order to recover more integrated modes 
of knowledge than often appear available in the present, thus challenging existing orders of 
knowledge. But the question of which histories are enlisted in this way is crucial: there are 
many possible modes of integration, and some accounts have favoured aesthetic aspects, while 
others have stressed epistemic and political ones. 
Who and what belongs in a utopia, and how are these humans and other beings formed—
what are their ontologies? A lot of debate about utopia has turned on the question of whether 
behaviours can be altered in line with the requirements of utopian societies, or whether there 
is an unalterable human nature. Levitas focuses on the question of “what is understood as 
human flourishing, what capabilities are valued, encouraged, and genuinely enabled, or 
blocked and supressed, by specific exiting or potential social arrangements […] the historical 
and social determination of human nature” (Levitas 2014, p. 153). In recent years, scholars 
including Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers and Donna Haraway have tried to think through the 
implications of more ontologically inclusive visions of community, though as we will see in 
sections six and seven, they do not always agree that this is a utopian project. As Garforth puts 
it, for these thinkers “the world we have made and must inhabit is a messy, dynamic 
assemblage of the natural, the technological and the human”: a picture which as we will see in 
sections six and seven can have powerfully utopian implications. (Garforth 2017, p. 138).  
What solidarities do utopian actions and imaginings involve? Utopian thinkers have 
approached the question of how to relate their commitments to the struggles of non-academic 
political movements in a number of different ways. This is sometimes a version of the problem 
of relating theory and praxis, but can also involve considerations about how analysts should 
relate to the practitioners they study: as critics, allies, or in terms of a different encounter. As 
we will see in section four, the problem of solidarity animated the British radical science 
movement in the 1970s and 80s. As I discuss in detail in sections six and seven, Latour and 
Stengers approach questions of solidarity very differently, despite similarities in their 
ontologies. 
How have utopian visions and struggles changed? One of the classic complaints about 
utopias is that they are static and unchanging (Moore 1966). Accounts of utopia also bear the 
traces of the historical conditions in which they were produced, and the viability of explicitly 
utopian modes of thought has ebbed and flowed. Marianne DeKoven argues that during the 
1960s a modernist form of utopian thought started to give way to a more ‘limited’, post-
modern, version of utopia, attached to a multiplication of identities, notions of internal 
resistance, rather than radical change. Utopia has become “muted, partial, local, diffuse, 
multiple, sceptical, complicit, displaced, and significantly refunctioned” (DeKoven 2004, p. 
25). During the same period, many positive accounts of utopia have also shifted from fixed 
blueprints to a more processual and reflexive view. We will see versions of this transformation 
play out repeatedly in this essay, especially in the legacies of scientific planning considered in 
section five, and in the developments of feminist thought discussed in section six. 
What role does violence play in utopian projects and imaginings?  Opponents of utopia 
have often argued that it seeks to create a perfect society and is prepared to resort to violence 
to do so. Advocates of utopia reject these claims, but usually do so by distancing themselves 
from totalitarian political regimes and movements such as the Soviet Union of the 1920s which 
have exerted considerable fascination for those seeking to imagine alternatives (Bernal 1939). 
This distancing is achieved in part through a redefinition of what should count as utopian—
but as recent works by Haraway and  Latour make clear, the place of violence in utopian 
visions cannot be solved by fiat. I discuss this in detail in sections six and seven. 
    Many of the discussions of utopia in STS and HPS have offered analyses of the utopias of 
others. In the process, scholars have sometimes articulated visions of their own, as well as 
giving a host of definitions about what utopias are and the functions which they serve. This is 
the subject of the next section. 
  
3. Other People’s Utopias 
  
Definitions of utopia are contested: different interpretations of the term serve as a battleground 
for treating different visions of the good life, or visions of change as meaningful, fantastical, 
irrelevant, necessary, or inevitable. Within HPS and STS, utopia tends to be invoked in five 
main ways: as a blueprint; as an existing alternative or ‘heterotopia’; as a simplification; as a 
performative tool; and as an ethos. What brings these senses together is that they are analyses 
of other people’s wishes and values—even if more normative accounts endorse some of them 
and not others, they do not generally represent analysts’ own cherished hopes. I will consider 
each of these uses in turn. 
Perhaps the best-known denunciations of blueprint utopianism are found in the work of 
Karl Popper, and is closely related to his philosophy of science. Popper offered a liberal 
critique of the totalitarianism which he claimed emerged from planned societies, especially 
those of the Soviet bloc. ‘Closed’ societies, Popper argued, identify end points in advance and 
reject serious consideration of the means needed to achieve them.  For advocates of planning 
“rational political action must be based upon a more or less clear and detailed description or 
blueprint of our ideal state, and also upon a plan or blueprint of the historical path that leads 
towards this goal” (Popper 1986 [1947], p. 5). Popper claimed that such blueprints would also 
lead to violence because their advocates could not accept the tendency of politics to wander 
from fixed ends. This contrasts with Popper’s view of the procedures of science, which are 
open-ended and could not rely on any final settled claims about knowledge, only a series of 
falsifications of statements which have been proven untrue (Popper 1963, pps. 33-9.) Science 
could thus serve as a liberal model for resistance to tyranny. 
It is now conventional for defences of utopia to distance themselves from the blueprints 
which Popper deplored (Jacoby 2005; Kumar 2010). Much recent explicitly utopian thought 
is open-ended and processual, even when it does not endorse Popper’s political liberalism. 
Thus, for example, Jacoby cites Lewis Mumford’s disgusted irritation at the empty aridity of 
many blueprint utopias, which were filled with “rigid virtues […] frozen institutions […] static 
and self-limiting ideals” (Mumford 1959, p. 5, cited in Jacoby 2005, p. 32). Jacoby instead 
seeks to promote the tradition of “iconoclastic  utopias” which did not “elaborate the future in 
precise detail” but rather “longed, waited, or worked for utopia but did not visualize it” (Jacoby 
2005, p. 33). We will see some of the ways that similar ways of thinking informed HPS and 
STS in the following section. 
When Popper’s arguments are counterposed to other positions regarding the emergent 
military-industrial-academic science of the Cold War, they retain an insistence on critical 
thought at odds with positions which view science as bound by community consensus and 
technical problem-solving. For this reason, Steve Fuller defends Popper’s positions against 
those of Thomas Kuhn (Fuller 2004). In Fuller’s reading, Kuhn speaks for a conservative and 
authoritarian vision of science, which refuses to question associations between scientists and 
the military industrial complex, while Popper affirms a more critical vocation. 
Popper’s picture of science can be connected with other studies from a liberal 
perspective which have understood scientific communities as embodying generally desirable 
political values. Michael Polanyi’s representation of scientific community as “the Republic of 
Science” has similar implications (Polanyi 1962). Polanyi argued that “in the free cooperation 
[of scientists] we shall find a highly simplified model of a free society, which presents in 
isolation certain basic features of it that are more difficult to identify within the comprehensive 
functions of a national body” (Polanyi 1962, p. 54). The self-coordination of scientists closely 
resembled rational decision-making and the transmission of information which Polanyi held 
to characterise the operation of markets as well: “Any attempt to organise the group of helpers 
under a single authority would eliminate their independent initiatives and thus reduce their 
joint effectiveness to that of the single person directing them from the centre. It would, in 
effect, paralyse their cooperation” (Polanyi 1962, p. 56). I return to Polanyi’s conflict with the 
planners of science in section five, below. 
These descriptions of science as offering models for a larger political order can be 
compared with accounts of scientific sites—notably laboratories and the research communities 
which are organised around them--which stress that they allow alternative values and forms of 
relation to flourish. Such sites recall Michel Foucault’s definition of “heterotopias”, as those 
“real places […] which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia 
in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault 1984 [1967], p. 3). For 
Foucault, heterotopias are not located in the future; instead  they exist alongside and athwart 
the existing social order, challenging the association between utopia and the future by realising 
the viable presence of alternatives in the present. The historian of biology Donald Fleming 
describes one laboratory as “one of the little communities of intellectual purpose and 
excitement that constitute the only genuine utopias of the twentieth century” (Fleming 1969, 
p. 179). Paul Josephson’s study of the Soviet science city of Akademgorodok presents that city 
as a place where forms of life were possible which were unavailable in the wider Soviet Union 
(Josephson 1997). Polanyi and Popper present science as a  model of ideal community, but 
also imply that the values which characterise scientific communities are more widely 
applicable. These heterotopian accounts, by contrast, stress the distance between the 
communities which they describe and the societies of which they form a part. 
Other invocations of utopia in STS and HPS challenge popular utopian images as 
simplistic fantasies. They argue that these utopias are a sign of immaturity, a belief that 
problems will be solved by new inventions and discoveries; or that disasters will follow from 
the same source. Eric Jensen writes that in media discussions of new biomedical technologies, 
“viewed as harbingers of unprecedented utopian possibilities […] indicate an impoverished 
and ‘thin’ public debate on the issue of human cloning” (Jensen 2008, p. 123). For Peter 
Weingart and his co-authors, meanwhile, utopia marks an immature stage through which many 
arguments about new technologies and scientific developments often pass. They describe 
 
a first phase [which] is characterized by far-reaching promises, even utopian visions of 
the implications of new research lines. These are met with value-bound resistance. The 
more utopian the promises, the more dystopian are the arguments in opposition to the 
new knowledge or technology. In a second phase of the debate, this value-bound 
resistance is gradually overcome as concrete research results are linked to individuals’ 
interests (Weingart, Salzmann, Wormann 2008, p. 382). 
  
For these scholars, utopia indicates a starting point for many debates, and which mature 
analysis will surpass. 
Even thin utopian images of the future can play an important role, however, by 
motivating action to bring about certain future possibilities. Studies of the Sociology of 
Expectations explore the performative roles of expectations and promises about science and 
technology (Borup 2006, Brown and Mike 2003). Promises about the future produced by 
scientists, funders and others invested in the production of scientific futures “inscribe subject 
positions, identities and interests; pit utopian or dystopian visions of the future against each 
other; and align various actors in different roles”, even, or especially, when they do not come 
true (Porter and Randals 2014, p. 203). Most sociologists of expectations argue that utopian 
visions are thin, and that technological achievements are rarely proportionate to the hopes 
which they raise; but these analysts also emphasise how powerful promises can shape action 
in the present and lock possible futures in to particular courses of development (Brown et al. 
2003).  
With a much wider historical perspective, Helen Tilley, Gayan Prakash and Michael 
Gordin’s edited collection Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Possibility also investigates the 
practical and performative role of utopian and dystopian visions. The editors start from the 
perspective that some historical moments are characterised by a sense that a radical reordering 
of social existence is within reach, and where images of the future which, in other times and 
places might serve as idle daydreams or unrealisable possibilities, come to act as resources for 
mobilising action in the present. Making sense of these times, they argue, “requires excavating 
the ‘conditions of possibility’ – even the ‘conditions of imaginability’—behind localized 
historical moments, an excavation that demands direct engagement with radical 
change” (Tilley, Prakash, Gordin, 2010, p. 2). Individual chapters study, among other topics, 
the shaping of visions around the Peaceful Atom, interactions between colonial missionary 
and Xhosa millennial visions of the future, and the utopian place of the street in modernist 
urbanism (Pinder 2010; Wenzel 2010; Krige 2010). This range of utopianisms is much more 
varied than the mobilisation of resources within contexts of innovation studied by sociology 
of expectation, but shares with those studies the sense that utopian visions are primarily a way 
to make things happen, to define identities and shared visions of the future, and inspire actions 
to bring them about. 
Utopianism has also been treated as a pervasive ethos of societies in which science and 
technology play a significant part. In 1984, mindful of the Orwellian connotations of the year, 
Nowotny and Everett Mendlesohn edited a collection entitled Ninety Eighty-Four: Science 
Between Utopia and Dystopia. In her introduction, Nowotny drew on Bloch to argue that 
“traces of utopian thinking can be found practically everywhere on the frontiers of science; 
they recur in mundane and practical embodiments in technological projections of what the 
future ought to look like” (Nowotny 1984, p. 4). Science pointed towards numerous 
‘inauthentic’ fantasy futures populated by technological marvels, but it also anticipated 
difficult-to-articulate and as yet unrealised futures. Tracing these visions made it necessary “to 
identify that part of the project of scientific creativity, which aims to realize a transcendental 
future” (p. 4). For the most part, though, these scientific and technical longings were reductive 
and controlling, based on fantasies of mastery over nature. The link between science and utopia 
could be found “in their common yearning for order […] Science and technology provided the 
methods, the content and the ideology to make a certain kind of future thinkable” (Nowotny 
1984, p. 8). Such futures assumed increases in rationality and progress: for Nowotny in 1984, 
such a view looked dubious and threadbare. 
   All of these approaches to utopia treat it as a phenomenon out there in the world, with real-
world consequences, and not as idle fantasy. Most also suggest it is a framing which analysis 
should try to get beyond, either by entertaining a vision of open-ended process as against fixed 
ends, or by developing more sophisticated ways of thinking about the effects of new 
technologies. These ways of talking about utopia do not address analysts’ own desires for 
change, except to the extent that these can temper and complicate the supposedly simplistic 
visions of the utopians. Yet process and ambivalence can also be powerfully utopian notions, 
and dreaming does not cease when we put aside reductive fantasies. The next section explores 
the ways in which visions of integration have motivated work in HPS and STS, and have been 
connected to larger utopian goals. 
  
 
4. Integrative Utopianism 
  
Towards the end of his study of romantic science and technology in post-Napoleonic France, 
John Tresch writes that he “sought to give a sympathetic hearing to thinkers and builders who 
saw artistic experiment, scientific research, introspection, technological innovation and social 
justice as tendrils growing from a common stem, demanding to be grafted or soldered back 
together—as materials and methods out of which better worlds can be made. Their futures do 
not belong only to the past” (Tresch 2012, p. 311).  This attitude can be called ‘integrative 
utopianism’. It is widespread in STS and HPS and is based on the belief that science is now 
sundered from other aspects of human existence, and union or reunion of different ways of 
knowing can lead to new possibilities for knowledge and thriving. Integration can be political, 
aesthetic, religious, epistemic, or psychological (Mauskof and Schmaltz 2011; Cantor and 
Kenny 2010). Sometimes, like Tresch, analysts appeal to historical examples to suggest the 
existence of more integrated modes of knowledge, and that these might provide models for the 
present. As James Delbourgo remarks, Bruno Latour’s recent work calls for a revival of modes 
of inquiry from the past “where science was not a dictatorship of facts but offered compelling 
images of nature to move us morally and aesthetically, as in the virtuosic combinations of 
precision measurement and artistic vision produced by the Enlightenment polymath Alexander 
von Humboldt” (Delbourgo 2018). Similarly, Joseph Needham’s studies of science in China 
inspired some twentieth century historians of science by making them “enthusiastic about this 
non-Western form of science that was deeply philosophical and religious and brought 
humankind into dialogue with the rest of nature”, in contrast with more secularised and 
instrumentalised Western sciences of the late twentieth century (Cantor, 2018).  
Important negative and positive appraisals of integration were voiced during the 
twentieth century. Max Weber’s 1918 lecture “Science as a Vocation”, a defence of the highly 
specialised character of modern science, and the separation between facts and values, sought 
to counter what Weber perceived as the desires for intuitionism, mysticism and immediate 
experience among German youth, on the grounds that such longings could never be satisfied 
(Weber 1946 [1922]). One of the most influential calls for aesthetic integration, CP Snow’s 
1959 Rede Lecture, The Two Cultures, is also one of the most misleading (Snow 1959). Snow, 
a novelist who had trained as a scientist and who worked for the British civil service, argued 
that the literary public knew nothing of science and the civil service excluded scientists from 
its upper ranks. This was a seriously misleading picture of the post-war British state. 
Nonetheless, it provided a catchphrase for the need to overcome division, which continues to 
be invoked in a fashion which Charlotte Sleigh calls “obligatory but uninspiring”, especially 
in studies of science and literature (Sleigh 2010, p.3; Ortalano 2009; Edgerton 2005). Snow’s 
complaint also helped to shape STS and HPS in institutional terms. Snow was cited in the 
foundation of the enormously influential Science Studies Unit at Edinburgh University, which 
was founded in 1966 at the behest of the biologist C. H. Waddington and the astronomer David 
Edge, who at the time was based at the Science Unit of the BBC. The goal of the unit, they 
wrote, was “to diminish, from the science side, the separation between the ‘two cultures’ (of 
the arts and the sciences), which had recently been highlighted by the novelist and prominent 
intellectual C.P. Snow” (quoted in Henry 2008). 
Tresch’s utopians do more than state the need for integration, of course: they are directly 
involved in struggles to articulate new ways of being, knowing and relating which emerge in 
part from their science and technology. At some moments, the integrative longings and STS 
and HPS have played a similar role. Many of the aspirations of HPS and STS were shaped in 
the political matrix of the New Left during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, left-wing 
arguments were pervaded with a critique of modernity which held that it reduced human beings 
to a “one-dimensional” existence, and that involvement with military-industrial science led to 
a derangement of reason, focusing on narrow technical considerations at the expense of 
recognising other values (DeKoven 2004, Berman 1993, Marcuse 2013 [1964]). These 
critiques sought especially to challenge what they perceived as the derangements of 
instrumental reason, especially as applied to cold war military planning and the conduct of the 
Vietnam War (Erickson et al. 2013). They also connected with the many arguments in favour 
of interdisciplinary and holistic approaches to political problem-solving associated with 
figures like Buckminster Fuller, which were also based on the idea that knowledge had become 
too specialised and too siloed (Fuller 1970, Blauvelt et al 2015). Part of the utopianism of this 
period was conceived in response to the recognition that blueprint utopianism of the sort which 
had been endorsed by the Communist Parties was too rigid and doctrinal, and needed to be 
replaced with a more diffuse and personal “education of desire” (Nadir 2010). Within this 
dispensation, utopia was “not to be found in a particular place or form”, but was conceived 
instead as “a movement toward possibilities.” (Bammer 2012, p. 58). It celebrated reflexivity 
and self-challenge as a way of moving beyond the doctrinal fixities of existing plans (Agar 
2008). Some movements by scientists and engineers partook in the utopianism of this era. 
During the 1960s, argues Matthew Wisnioski, “engineers were among the most reflective 
thinkers about the possibilities and limitations of their interventions”, developing an ethos 
which was commendable “not because it proscribes [sic] a new way of life, but because it 
insists our assumptions remain perpetually contested” (Wisnioski 2012, p. 198). 
In Britain, these struggles and critiques found a meeting place in the British Radical 
Science Movement (Rose and Rose 1979). Gary Werskey, a Marxist historian who was active 
within the Movement, terms the period 1965-1985 the era of “radical science”; Werskey’s own 
work was dedicated to recovering and reappraising earlier radical traditions within British 
science, including those of JD Bernal and Joseph Needham (Werskey 1978, 2007). Although, 
as Alice Bell has noted, some participants in the radical science movement subsequently 
regarded it as conflict-averse and overly respectable, its participants also attempted to live out 
their values in ways which involved going beyond the limits of the academy (Bell, 2013). 
Members of the Movement appealed to activism in the present, alongside historical examples, 
as offering directions for political action and academic study. They also tried to relate these 
debates to more encompassing visions of a less divided life. Their debates turned around the 
following questions: 
  
within radical science itself, how much effort needed to go into the development of 
theoretical understanding of capitalist science and agitational struggles focused on 
specific scientific practices, and how could these be most fruitfully related? Second, how 
could the sum total of radical science activities coexist with and be linked to other forms 
of left politics, by now a highly fractured warren of political parties and sects, bisected 
by a huge number of issues-based campaigns, and overlaid with a myriad of Marxisms? 
Third, how and where did the sum total of these activities sit within the context of all 
our other life-commitments? (Werskey 2007, p. 432). 
  
Similar commitments and attempts to build solidarity informed the scholarship of this period, 
as did a sense that action to develop scientific and technological alternatives was likely to arise 
from the struggles of radicals and trade unionists. In his article “Marx and the Machine” 
Donald MacKenzie noted recent efforts to develop alternative technologies, including 
“attempts to embody in technology the virtues of small scale, decentralization, and ecological 
awareness”, and also “attempts from within high-technology industry to alter in fundamental 
ways both what is produced and how it is produced” which sought to “shift production from 
military to ‘socially useful’ products, and also to change the nature of production, to reverse 
in practice deskilling and the separation of head and hand” (MacKenzie 1984, p. 
502).  MacKenzie concluded that “by making contingency and choice actual rather than merely 
hypothetical, they throw into ever-sharper light the ways in which social relations shape 
technical development. Perhaps too the process can be dialectical, rather than one-way” 
(MacKenzie 1984, p. 502). The influential social historian of Darwinism Robert Young left 
the field of academic history to retrain as a Kleinian psychotherapist and launch a book imprint 
called Free Association Books, which focused on the importance of integrating disparate parts 
of the self and overcoming binaries. Young also founded a journal called Human Nature 
Review which aimed “to bring into communication the variety of approaches to understanding 
human nature which have a regrettable tendency to be less touch with one another than they 
might” (Young 2018).  
In Werskey’s account, radical science was defeated within the academy—part of the 
larger eclipse of Marxist critique within science studies. He quotes Young’s statement from 
1985 that  “The ... promise of a reflective and critically self-conscious radical science 
movement that was apparent in the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science 
conference on the Social Impact of Modern Biology in 1970 has not been fulfilled” (Young 
1985, p. ix, cited Werskey 2007, p. 443). I do not quote this claim to endorse it. Instead I want 
to remark that, as with Tresch’s romantics, a sense of unrealised possibility hovers over the 
politically integrative vision which Werskey and his colleagues sought to foster. Radical 
Science becomes, in Werskey’s telling, a comparatively brief episode from which future 
studies in STS and HPS might draw inspiration. This nostalgic approach to the possibilities of 
the 1970s is mirrored by renewed attention among scholars and activists in the Lucas Plan, 
with the launch of a successor to the plan in 2016 as well as wider attempts to revive political 
options developed before the 1980s, which have been widely construed as unviable (Medhurst 
2014; The New Lucas Plan 2019). The appeal of these arguments is clear, but they focused 
attention on exemplary moments of radical change which were then defeated rather than the 
more ambiguous legacies of those struggles. Calls for integration were produced from specific 
historical contexts but are sometimes treated as though they are applicable in all contexts. In 
addition, the argument that epistemic, political and environmental peril arises chiefly from a 
belief in the divisions of modernity can be taken for granted, and prevent us interrogating the 
vocations of ultra-specialism. Considering integration as a contested and powerful longing 
through which scholars have sought to relate their political, religious and aesthetic 
commitments to their scholarship prevents it from being treated as an ahistorical panacea—
something we should always want, and which is always defeated somehow. 
The long-standing sense of lost integration and wishes for its restoration can be 
contrasted with another utopian theme: the argument that sciences should be planned for social 
benefit. Unlike integration, planning is not usually treated as an approach with direct lessons 
for the present on close examination, however, some planners turn out to offer a rich picture 
of science, which has remained meaningful even when their larger schemes have been 
abandoned. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
  
5. Planning and Pluralism 
  
One of the utopian horizons of scientific research during the first half of the twentieth century 
was that it could be brought under rational control and planned to bring about immediate social 
benefit. In 1984, Nowotny remarked that “the ideal of planning is utopia in action; it has its 
practitioners and has found its theoreticians as well”, and added that scientists’ direct 
involvement in utopian projects “occur[ed] at a time when the conscious planning of a whole 
society seems to have made its first break-through in the real world, after the first World War 
when the old Order was crumbling practically everywhere in Europe and the new Order 
seemed seductively near by” in the scientific achievements of the early Soviet Union 
(Nowotny 1984, p. 11). This belief in planning was, for Nowotny, a delusive mirage, and from 
the perspective of 1984 it was hard to understand “the intellectual fascination that radiated 
from this unique, large scale experiment and to imagine the lingering grip it exerted upon the 
mind of intellectuals of that time” (Nowotny 1984, p. 12). 
   In Britain one of the chief political advocates of scientific planning was the crystallographer 
and historian JD Bernal, although many scientists who were sympathetic towards the Soviet 
Union described its embrace of planning in glowing terms. Bernal’s advocacy forms the 
background for Polanyi’s defence of ‘pure science’ as operating on the model of a market 
(Pielke 2014).  Bernal himself felt that the only context in which his ideas of planning had 
achieved something like practical realisation was that of war, and the ‘planned science’ which 
he advocated can most plausibly be associated with post-war enterprises such as the British 
nuclear bomb. As Werskey remarks, the advent of “planned capitalist science” was profoundly 
dismaying for Bernal (Werskey 2007, p. 421). 
Unlike the inspirational defeats of integrative utopianism, visions of planning are 
rejected because of their institutionalisation and destructive consequences. They do not retain 
the critical charge of a path not taken. There have been few explicit attempts to revive the 
kinds of planning which proliferated during the early twentieth century, even among those who 
are sympathetic to the construction of architectural visions of the future. Thus, for example, 
the sociologist John Urry, whose final works concern the relations between social science and 
the future, argues that sociologists should be willing to produce explicit scenarios in order to 
guide decision-making. Urry also, however, distances himself from the term ‘planning’, “since 
that has become an ideologically contaminated term from the era of organized capitalism and 
social democracy” (Urry 2016, p. 15). Planning is not adequate to cope with the uncertainties 
and non-linear risks, including those arising from science and technology, which face 
contemporary societies. In their place, Urry advocates the production of narratively rich and 
reflexive scenarios. He discusses the origins of such scenarios in their use in the corporate 
sector, and notes how they combine an analysis of present trends with the identification of 
credible outcomes, together with plausible actions which might lead from the future to more 
desirable versions of the future (Urry 2016, pps. 97-99). Scenarios are also, implicitly at least, 
bottom-up and involve many different contributors, in contrast to the rigidity associated with 
past images of planning. 
The works of individual planners turn out to be richer and stranger than denunciations 
of planning suggest. The prospects of planning allow for critical approaches towards scientific 
knowledge and the ways in which decisions are made about research, and they were sometimes 
reformulated in response to historical events. The planner who has received the most sustained 
scholarly attention in recent years is the Austrian polymath Otto Neurath. Neurath was a 
typical modernist planner in that he believed advances in science and technology would bring 
about increasing rational control over their future development (Uebel 2012; Cartwright et al. 
2008; Nemeth 1991, 1996). Neurath presented utopia as the vocation of the “social engineer”, 
and “frequently appealed to the sciences as flexible and creative tools for planning” (Reisch 
1996, p. 167). Deciding which of several possible plans should be followed required the 
explicit articulation of alternatives. By showing that the specific development of individual 
sciences was artificial, Neurath would show how it could have developed along alternative 
lines. As Elisabeth Nemeth puts it: “Neurath’s Utopia was that the scientists’ collectively 
gained consciousness of the artificial and practical nature of their knowledge would lay bare 
the functioning of science in its entirety and so make it manageable and usable” (Nemeth 1991, 
p. 291). By explicating and demystifying what scientists knew, the social engineer would help 
to make their findings accessible to democratic contestation. The social engineer could help to 
generate these plans, but was unable to rank them; this was an irreducibly political task. 
In relation to science, this process of examining plural possibilities extended to the sense 
that there could always be alternatives and it was always necessary to choose between them: 
  
The scientific approach to reality is, according to Neurath, inevitably utopian: the 
science which he proposes to us cannot say anything about the ‘one’ reality since it 
analyses the ‘given’ reality by juxtaposing it with other possibilities, thus making it ‘only 
one possible one.’ For precisely this reason, science can never reveal ‘the’ utopia but 
always only ‘groups of utopia.’ (Nemeth 1996, p. 12). 
  
In his later work, and against the background of political catastrophe in Europe, Neurath pulled 
back from belief in the imminence of a socialist reordering of society, focusing instead on 
creating an encyclopaedia which would demonstrate the unity of science. This work “focuses 
in concrete terms on the development of an alternative to the images of knowledge and of 
reality which make us believe that there is no alternative” (Nemeth 1996, p. 13). Alongside 
Neurath’s advocacy of planning, then, is a powerful streak of more critical utopianism, a 
challenge to given assumptions about science and society and a revelation of the constructed 
nature of science as a single, unified, enterprise. It is for this reason that the philosophers Nancy 
Cartwright and Lola Fleck champion Neurath’s approach towards science: rather than 
proclaiming a singular, unified science, his works made clear that “world is unified only in 
action”, rather than taken for granted as the natural order of knowledge (Cartwright et al. 2008, 
p. 256). 
Something of Neurath’s utopian aspiration to reveal the possibility of alternatives within 
and alongside the existing order of scientific knowledge have affinities in the work of later 
philosophers. I will give the example of Hasok Chang’s writings on scientific pluralism. 
(While Chang has written on Neurath, and was Cartwright’s doctoral student, I do not mean 
to suggest that Neurath is a direct inspiration for Chang’s philosophy. Instead, comparison of 
the two allows us to see how similar intuitions about knowledge develop in different historical 
and institutional contexts (Cat, Cartwright, Chang 1996).) Chang argues that past scientific 
theories can often be revived and developed further, if they were abandoned for no good 
reason. Some of the entities which have been given up, including phlogiston and frigorific 
rays, could have been generative of alternative scientific possibilities: this should be the task 
of historians and philosophers. This calling, Chang claims, is “intellectual and political”, a way 
to “face up to the fact that suppressed and neglected questions represent a loss of knowledge, 
actual and potential” (Chang 2004, p. 237). In this mode, Chang writes, the academic 
discipline of HPS “can recover useful ideas and facts lost in the record of past science, address 
foundational questions concerning present science, and explore alternative conceptual systems 
and lines of experimental inquiry for future science” (Chang 2004, p. 237). 
Compared to Neurath’s, Chang’s vision is remarkably modest. It is meant to allow 
students to ask questions which they cannot ask in the usual course of their studies; and to 
provide a vocation for the academic disciplines of history and philosophy of science in the 
training of scientists---a desire for education, more than the education of desire. Nevertheless, 
Chang’s approach allows a range of scientific temporalities to coexist, and for the past as 
recovered by historians and philosophers, to act as a resource for the recovery of possible 
alternative scientific futures from the defeats of the past. 
In considering the legacies of utopian visions of scientific planning, then, we find a 
considerable intellectual heritage within HPS, combined with a sense that the larger project 
and methods of planning cannot be recovered. Bernal’s framing of scientific organisation 
persists as a point of departure for social historians of science, but his arguments for directing 
research to immediate social utility generally have not been revived. Neurath’s holistic utopian 
vision fragments into the problems of finding new modes to produce desirable futures and the 
ways in which pluralist philosophers have taken up aspects of his epistemology. 
Part of the legacy of planning is its institutionalisation: a success which meant that it 
could no longer be posited as a critical alternative. The next section discusses the ways in 
which scholars have drawn upon and developed insights from feminism in order to imagine 
different possibilities for science. 
  
  
6. Feminist Threads 
  
Perhaps the most sophisticated reflection on utopia in HPS and STS has developed in dialogue 
with feminist theory and activism. The thinkers considered in this section, all of whom are 
influenced by, if sometimes resistant to, feminism, are utopians in the sense that they accept 
the following set of connected claims:  
 
a) aq belief that the present-day practices of science can be challenged and transformed.  
b) That challenge and transfomratoin can be achieved by forms of knowledge more in 
tune with the historical experience of women and other oppressed groups. 
c) That these forms of knowledge are anticipated by ways of knowing and relating 
which already exist in the present.  
d) And that critique also involves an engagement with imaginative literature, 
especially science fiction. 
 
Analyses of feminism are often organised in generational terms, with a more essentialist 
‘second wave’—insisting on women’s struggle and often identifying distinctive female kinds 
of knowledge, and ways of being, opposed to patriarchal norms—giving way to a more ironic 
and ambivalent ‘third wave’, which is keen to decentre and deconstruct essentialist notions 
and binaries, such as the one between nature and culture (Kelly 2005; Baumgardner and 
Richards 2000; Snyder 2008). Though there are many problems with this generational framing, 
it does capture some of the development in critical feminist accounts between the 1970s and 
the 1990s. 
Evelyn Fox Keller’s biography of Barbara McClintock was widely read as 
demonstrating that a non-masculine science was possible, with knowledge based on relation 
and care and opposed to reductionism (Fox Keller 1974).  In her contribution to 
the 1984 volume, Fox Keller argues for the possibility of using maternal love as an alternative 
model for scientific knowledge. To flesh out this possibility, Fox Keller turns to Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman’s 1915 novel Herland, which offers tantalising hints of a social order—and a 
science—based on feminine values rather than masculine ones (Gilman 1979 [1915]). The 
problem with Gilman’s novel, Fox Keller writes, is that it is bloodless, giving no meaningful 
role to erotic love; she concludes that perhaps the feminist theorists of 1984 can provide a 
utopian imaginary of maternal knowledge which is capable of being disturbed by erotic desire 
(Fox Keller 1984, p. 271). 
Carolyn Merchant’s 1980 book The Death of Nature: Women and Ecology and the 
Scientific Revolution depicted the scientific revolution as involving an abandonment of earlier 
animistic conceptions of the cosmos in favour of starkly gendered language about obtaining 
knowledge of a feminised nature through torture and rape (Merchant 1980). As Katherine Park 
notes, Merchant’s analytic perspective drew on the critical feminist utopian fiction of the 
1970s, and she paid close attention to the utopian writings of the seventeenth century as 
offering an alternative to Baconian torture-norms (Park 2006). Regarded with a degree of 
suspicion by many historians of science, Merchant’s book has been important for literary 
historians and especially scholars of early science fiction, by inspiring inquiry into critical 
approaches towards nascent scientific knowledge during the early modern period. 
By the mid-1980s, Sandra Harding was arguing that feminist accounts of science needed 
to go beyond the exposure of bias and to develop a “successor science”, based on “a view of 
natural knowledge which would bring with it a new form of ‘objectivity’ supported by a new 
understanding of the relationship between mind and nature” (Harding 1986; Gatens-Robinson 
1991, p. 417). This project could draw inspiration from historical examples like McClintock. 
As conceptualised by Donna Haraway, successor science was developed into a more partial 
Utopian mode. Haraway wrote that such studies should aim to provide “a more adequate, 
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to 
our own as well as others’ practices of domination and the unequal parts of privilege and 
oppression that make up all positions” (Haraway 1988, 579). Haraway’s shift in emphasis 
aimed to bring out the limitations and fragmentation of all perspectives, challenging 
associations between masculinity and reason, but also insisting on the collusions and 
violenceof female subject-positions. 
Another of Haraway’s other major works of the mid-1980s, The Cyborg Manifesto, has 
found an extraordinarily wide readership within cultural and literary studies as well as within 
STS. Haraway’s cyborg was intended as an ambivalent figure of late capitalism. On the one 
hand, she celebrated the productive potentials of new technologies, and the new forms of 
relation and solidarity between partial, situated and embodied knowledges which they could 
enable, a new world which transgressed boundaries and suggested a post-modern play of 
possibilities. Haraway’s manifesto proposed “the utopian dream of the hope of a monstrous 
world without gender”; the not-yet, speculative aspect of its figurations was key to its intent 
(Haraway 1985, p. 181). In Helen Kuryllo’s words, Haraway “identifies several areas of 
boundary breakdown, including that between human and animal, but focuses primarily on the 
intersection between human and machine” (Kuryllo 1994, p. 50).Haraway also sought to keep 
in view those who were damaged and disenfranchised by globalised communication systems. 
As Jackie Orr puts it, Haraway “conjures the potent utopian figure of the cyborg as an 
imaginative resource for feminists facing a night dream of post-industrial society, the scary 
new networks of coded hieroglyphics that now produce so much more than just the secret 
ontology of Marx’s commodity fetish” (Orr 2012, p. 274). The cyborg is meant to name the 
processes by which human bodies, machines, flows of capital, and the non-human world 
become entwined, and offer partial resistance to domination. Some of Haraway’s readers saw 
the affirmative side of this but not the ambivalence, and rejected the manifesto as an uncritical 
embrace of new technologies (Kafer 2013, p. 103). 
  Haraway has long turned towards science fiction as an imaginative resource to 
envisage alternative social and scientific orders (Haraway 1989). She has also argued that her 
theorisation of scientific practice emerges in part from taking seriously their historical and 
contingent nature. Thus, although the “Manifesto” is most certainly not a work of historical 
analysis, Haraway traces its genesis in part to her own awareness of the “radical historicity” 
of scientific objects and practices: 
  
I loved biology and I seriously, passionately engaged with its knowledge products: its 
materialities, organisms and worlds. But I also always inhabited biology from an equally 
powerful academic formation in philosophy […] I was extremely interested in the way 
the organism is an object of knowledge as a system of the production and partition of 
energy, or a system of division of labour with executive functions. This is the history of 
the ecosystem as an object that could have only come into being in the context of 
resource managements, the tracking of energies through trophic layers, the tagging 
apparatuses made possible by Savanah River Nuclear facilities, and the emergence of 
wartime interdisciplinarities in cybernetic, nuclear chemistry and systems theories. It 
was never really possible for me to inhabit biology without a kind of impossible 
consciousness of the radical historicity of these objects of knowledge (Haraway in Gane 
2006, p. 135-6). 
  
Part of the ontology informing the Cyborg Manifesto, then, is how scientists would 
conceive their objects if they took their history seriously, and engaged them with the kind of 
united sensibility—a joint formation in biology and philosophy—for which integrative 
utopians have longed. Haraway has subsequently distanced herself from the term ‘post-
humanism’, arguing that it lent itself to interpretations that ignored the material basis of 
information in favour of the celebration of unlimited and unfettered disembodiment: a techno-
utopianism which she regards with deep suspicion. Her own critical utopian project has 
demanded different vocabularies and alternative figurations. 
Haraway’s later work has instead talked about different kinds of entanglement which 
unsettle the categories of the human and of gender. These include non-human “companion 
species” and SF, a widely ranging term of unstable reference which includes “Speculative 
Feminism”, “Science Fantasy”, “Science Fact” and “String Figures”—the last of which is 
intended to capture the crafty, caring, communal practices of dwelling (Haraway 2003; 2013). 
The reference is deliberately shifting and playful, but is animated by the desire for a contingent 
figuration adequate to “propose and enact patterns for participants to inhabit, somehow, on a 
vulnerable and wounded earth” (Haraway 2016, p. 10).  Haraway argues that her work is a 
kind of reparative speculative storytelling which imagines modes of relation which allow 
people to abide with ecological difficulty and harm without seeking to escape or transcend it, 
and recognising the immense damage and unending dying which is likely to ensue.  To this 
end, she writes touchingly about human entanglements in the lives of verminous animals such 
as pigeons, and the importance of quotidian activities such as composting (Haraway 2016, pps. 
31-2). She has also written a fiction of her own, the “Camille Stories”. These are multi-
generational narratives about how humans and human descendants might be able to survive in 
the future, premised on the development of modes of kinship (between humans, animals, and 
other non-humans) less oriented towards biological reproduction (Haraway 2016, pps. 134-
168). 
Haraway’s stories retain her earlier work’s concern with finding figurations which are 
adequate to a situation of immense possibility which is also a condition of devastation. The 
scenario amounts to a kind of playful architecture of a survivable future, without seeking to 
offer a directive map. It owes a great deal to the utopian and dystopian feminist SF of the 60s 
and 70s, and indeed functions as a kind of pastiche of that genre. Some critics have read 
Haraway’s narrative scenario as more architectural than her previous work. She has been 
criticised for a destructive—even genocidal—utopianism. As Sophie Lewis writes: 
  
Population reduction, as [Haraway] now fantasizes it, is declared by fiat to be 
nondiscriminatory, friendly, collective, and non-coercive. […] One would be justified 
in expecting to get some elaboration on how the removal of 8 billion heads from the total 
headcount over the next century or so could be non-coercive – indeed, non-genocidal. 
But there is really only a fable, based around a micro-community in the United States, 
proclaiming that this is possible. The utopia of 2-3 billion human beings is supposed to 
arise from a choice, simply, to not make babies (Lewis 2017). 
  
This reading of Haraway is enabled by her decision to leave the speculative and ambivalent 
mode of her previous utopian writing in favour of a narrative form which offers descriptions 
of determinate future possibilities. As a story of the steps necessary for a general human 
flourishing, it also seems to step outside the limited and oppositional subject position which 
Haraway has characteristically occupied in the past. Haraway also emphasises the 
provisionality of her narrative, how it has been created in collaboration with others and how 
she hopes it will be developed further in the future. Charitably, one could interpret this as a 
response to the tension between her own standpoint and the longing for a community adequate 
to tell a story of a liveable future. In Haraway’s words: “Every Camille Story that I write will 
make terrible political and ecological mistakes; and every story asks readers to practice 
generous suspicion by joining in the fray of inventing a bumptious crop of Children of 
Compost” (Haraway 2016, p. 136). This raises the spectre of utopian violence, which more 
playful modes of utopian writing are able to hold at bay. But Haraway does not consider the 
violent implications of her scenario directly. 
Haraway records that she wrote the first of her Camille stories at a colloquium 
convened by the philosopher Isabelle Stengers, and it is with Stengers’ work that I will 
conclude this section (Haraway 2016, p. xii). Stengers is extremely sceptical of positions which 
attempt to offer authoritative criticism as outsiders. Stengers’ speculative approach and her 
suspicion of critique which sets itself up as an external arbiter extends to her reading of 
imaginative literature. Thus, she writes, “My participation in the field of science studies has 
[…] been sustained by my experience as a science fiction reader, from which I learned that it 
is possible to fully affirm that ‘social’ character of scientific practices without using such 
affirmation as a general critical weapon” (Stengers 2018, p. 26).  And it extends also to her 
attitude towards utopia: she insists that her position is “not utopian”, but she wants “to hold on 
to a basic kind of ignorance: we still do not know what people are able to do. […]  I want to 
reclaim the insight of those who explore what people together are capable of achieving in 
concrete situations and on concrete issues from the starting point that the environment makes 
us ill.” (Latour, Stengers, Tsing 2018, p. 593). She represents her more oppositional encounters 
with existing institutions in terms of resistance. In her book Another Science is Possible, she 
turns to Three Guineas, Virginia Woolf’s polemic of 1938, in order to challenge the 
unacceptable collusions which contemporary science involves. Woolf’s “unremittingly tough” 
analysis and refusal to join up with causes, her identification of “the prestigious English 
colleges that churn out people who are both conformist and secretly violent, whose capacity 
for violence flares up when they sense they are in danger” helps Stengers to shape her own 
insistence on resisting the demands of “this academic world that is being destroyed in the name 
of excellence” (Stengers 2018b, p. 29). Stengers advocates slowing down and behaving like 
an ‘idiot’, who takes things too literally and is prepared to be appalled at taken-for-granted 
ways of speaking and acting. Thus, she writes, if unemployment is justified by metaphors of 
economic warfare then people who are made unemployed should be honoured with medals 
and parades, and rewarded as veterans (Stengers 2005). If these honours and recognitions are 
not being given, there is every indication that it is not a real war. 
    In place of a masterful critique, Stengers gives a speculative account of how the sciences, 
and scientists, might develop from the specific perspectives, relations, and interactions 
involved in their individual fields.    Stengers uses the metaphor of an “ecology of practices” 
to identify the complex interdependencies which scientific work involves (Stengers 2005). A 
philosopher or critic might wish to address these ecologies, but must not do so from a 
presumption of masterful critique. To grasp the transformative and relational possibilities of 
scienitific practice, Stengers uses the metaphor of “reciprocal capture”: a scientist enters into 
relation with the objects which she studies, constructing their possibilities, but is also shaped 
and situated by those objects in turn (Stengers 2010, 90-1). Each area of scientific inquiry is 
guided by distinct passions: ‘obligations’ to allow scientists to make truth claims associated 
with it in specific ways, and ‘requirements’ about how it shall be allowed to affect the world 
within which it is situated (Stengers 2010, pps. 49-50). In articulating her notions of scientific 
practice, Stengers draws extensively on the works of Bruno Latour, which I consider in detail 
in the next section. Latour also refers  to Stengers at length. While many commonalities exist 
between their projects, I want to emphasise some of the major differences. 
The relational specificity and opportunities for becoming which each scientific practice 
affords are, in Stengers’ telling, betrayed when science is presented in a ‘polemical’ mode, as 
though it discovered straightforward universal truths. Such falsely universalising claims are 
sustained through the disavowal of alternative perspectives; Stengers wants to ask what science 
and scientists could become if the need for such denials were no longer deemed essential for 
the sciences to make factual claims, and to address the world (Stengers 2010, pps. 28-41). One 
of the areas in which her work has been most discussed is in discussions of epistemologies of 
care, and how these might conduce to alternative modes of knowledge and relation within the 
sciences (de La Bellacasa 2011). But Stengers’ work is at once more forbidding and more 
welcoming than focus on care implies: she seeks not only to imagine how existing scientific 
practices could be slightly different, but also the ways in which their whole range of 
characteristic achievements might be brought into more meaningful encounters with one 
another, and with other ways of being in the world. The outcome of such meetings can never 
be decided in advance; it is “an event”, whose speculative possibility Stengers calls 
“Cosmopolitics” (Stengers 2010). 
In challenging the disavowals which underpin polemical accounts of science, Stengers 
has been eclectic in her solidarities while trying to avoid presenting herself as a spokesperson 
for particular groups. She has reflected on the perturbing effects of engaging with the activism 
of drug-users’ advocacy groups, and neo-pagan activists (Stengers 2008, p. 39). She seeks to 
extend this solidarity into the past, by addressing the perspectives of sophists and witches. She 
asks how presentations of knowledge in the present day, and most critiques of them, rely on 
the exclusion of these views. She writes that she seeks to learn from the otherness of these 
groups without dominating them through her own theorising, instead seeking to preserve the 
bewildered and inarticulate shock of “the (unsophisticated) cry of those who ask 
‘what did happen to us?’” (Stengers 2008, p. 49). Stengers’ point is to find encounters with the 
shock and dislocations which comes from dispossession without attempting to make mute and 
bewildered loss more articulate than it is. The point is not to convert to witchcraft, but to think 
through the consequences of the fact that witches were once considered sufficiently threatening 
and powerful to annihilate, and that those who inherit such traditions do so in a knowledge of 
their brokenness. Engaging with these devastated knowledges and practices is “an adventure, 
both empirical and pragmatic” which she calls reclaiming: “it does not primarily mean taking 
back what was confiscated, but rather learning what it takes to inhabit again what was 
devastated” (Stengers 2008, p. 58). 
Many of the concepts developed as part of the feminist account of science have been 
foundational for STS—from situated knowledges, encounters with non-humans, 
epistemologies of care, and the possibility of reading speculative literature in order to envisage 
social and technical alternatives. Different feminist thinkers have, however, differed quite 
significantly in how they have thought about solidarity and the demands of resistance as 
opposed to those of articulating developed alternative schemes. A particular strength of these 
approaches has been their sympathy for perspectives which have been marginalised within the 
mainstream of natural science. Some similarly generative—and disruptive—ontological 
insights emerge from the work of Bruno Latour, the subject of the next section. But they are 




7. Ontology and Enmity: Bruno Latour and Utopia 
  
Haraway avers that 
 
Intent on the crucial refusal of self-certainty and pre-existing god tricks […] Latour turns 
to a resource—relentless reliance on the material-semiotic trope of trials of strength—
that, I think, makes it unnecessarily hard to tell his and our needed new story. He defines 
war as the absence of a referee so that trials of strength must determine the legitimate 
authority.” […] sciences (always rooted in practices) are war. Therefore, in Latour’s 
passionate speculative fabulation, such war is our only hope for real politics (Haraway 
2016, p. 42). 
  
In this paragraph, Haraway offers a utopian critique of the work of Bruno Latour. It is a dense 
argument, and I will return to what she means below. For now, it serves to introduce the fact 
that the question of Latour’s (anti-)utopianism is more fraught than that of any of the other 
thinkers considered in this paper.  
The utopian potential of Latour’s work consists chiefly in the implications of the 
ontology which underwrites his startling redescriptions of scientific practice. Creative 
scientific research always, for Latour, involves collaboration between human and non-human 
agencies. Careful attention to these collaborations shows that they leave neither the humans 
nor the non-humans unchanged: rather, agency is redistributed between them, in ways which 
upset distinctions between nature and culture, or science and politics. In a polemic attached to 
the end of his book The Pasteurization of France, this view of agency and trials allowed Latour 
to present a picture in which scientists could “never hope to do better than politicians” (Latour 
1988, p. 210).  Subsequent work expands his arguments to argue for a version of political 
ecology based on the incorporation of non-humans into political community and the shaping 
of a common world, and to a general anthropological account of the ways in which “the 
moderns” make sense of the worlds which they construct and inhabit (Latour 2013). Part of 
Latour’s goal in these studies has been to refuse distinctions between modern and pre-modern 
ways of being and forms of knowledge: in Latour’s resonant phrase “we have never been 
modern” (Latour 1993). 
Latour is usually scornful of attempts to integrate disparate domains, because attempts 
to unify imply acceptance that the initial division had some validity (Latour 2004, p. 57). In 
the conduct of scientific controversies, Latour argues, we are always producing hybrid entities 
which mess up existing distinctions—especially the ones between culture and nature. If we 
could be honest about this, we would stop deluding ourselves about their separation. And, 
more surprisingly perhaps, social histories of science would have their day, for it would turn 
out that the links historians have traced between social forces, religious practices, and natural 
scientific investigations have always been an accurate picture of how the entities of science 
are formed: “purity would sterilize the sciences: behind the force, the wings of angels are 
always beating invisibly” (Latour 2017, p. 66). 
    Latour’s 2004 book Politics of Nature provides a fleshed out speculative account of how 
political institutions would be transformed if his insights about ontology and the activism 
which he terms “political ecology” were thoroughly absorbed. Lisa Garforth remarks that this 
book recalls the form of a utopian novel, and that though his “proposals for new political 
institutions may not be terribly practical—and they certainly lack the charm, detail and realism 
of the political institutions imagined and described in formal utopian fiction. But as a 
provocation to think differently about politics, nature and the organization of our common life, 
they are unsettling” (Garforth 2017, p. 143). Latour proposes the construction of a “parliament 
of things”, in which the status of spokespeople for existing political interests, spokespeople for 
nonhuman interests, and the instruments and media through which such claims are produced 
and circulated achieve a degree of parity (Latour 1993, pps. 142-145). The tone of the book is 
irenic and generally optimistic: Latour calls for ‘diplomats’ who will be able to traverse the 
worlds of science and politics equally, without deciding in advance how decisions should be 
made. 
In Latour’s most recent works, the challenge of what he terms “the new climate regime” 
permits the provisional possibility of realising the mistakes involved in constructing purified 
categories and abstraction, and for a fraught kind of homecoming (Latour 2017). In this work, 
James Lovelock’s concept of Gaia plays a central role: Gaia names a non-human world which 
is active and resists human intentions, refusing to act as a static backdrop. But it is also 
composed of an immense variety of local interactions, which lead to larger effects without 
cohering into a totality. In this respect, Gaia can be opposed to visions of “the globe” or “the 
local” which allow these concepts to be treated in abstraction from specific sets of relations 
and distributions of agency (Latour 2017, p. 145). Latour writes that the figure of Gaia “is 
presented here as the occasion for a return to Earth that allows for a differentiated version of 
the respective qualities that can be required of sciences, politics, and religions, as these are 
finally reduced to more modest and more earthbound definitions of their former vocations” 
(Latour 2017, p. 4).  Facing Gaia advocates a “course of treatment”, which may help to seed 
the possibility of new ways of going forward, which are less based on corrosive fantasies of 
mastery and separation (Latour 2017, p. 13). 
As I noted in the introduction to this essay, Latour usually regards utopia as the enemy. 
Other critical accounts of Latour’s philosophy note his tendency to make claims which “sound 
simultaneously reserved and revolutionary”, or condemn his “wishful thinking fostered by the 
misuse, or over-extension, of his theoretical tools” (Whiteside 2013, p. 185; Turner 2014, p. 
119). Rather than emphasising partial knowledges and situated resistance, as Stengers and 
Haraway do, Latour tends to talk as though dominant practices and mainstream institutions 
will need to transform in response to the emergence of the New Climate Regime. His work 
shows an abiding fascination for political and scientific centres and metaphors of strength.  
Others have used Latour as a foil to articulate their own utopian accounts. Andrew 
Pickering acknowledges his debt to Latour’s ontology, which helps him to articulate the 
“dance” and free-play involved in interactions between humans and non-humans, especially 
in the context of cybernetic experimentation (Pickering 2009). But Pickering also distinguishes 
his own work from Latour’s on the grounds that Latour is not concerned with addressing 
ground-level phenomena. According to Pickering, Latour believes that scientific practices are 
fine as they are, and problems arise from the false accounts which are given of them. 
Pickering’s own accounts of agency are meant to affirm more interactive, searching and 
plafyful modes of inquiry, which means that he also engages with the history of countercultural 
practices informed by Cybernetics, including RD Laing’s radical approach to the treatment of 
schizophrenia and Stafford Beer’s contributions to cybernetic socialism in Chile (Pickering 
2010).  These initiatives, Pickering argues, show that cybernetics had a playful and counter-
cultural aspect; they are all also thoroughly immersed in the utopianism of the 1960s. Latour 
usually aims to investigate mainstream scientific practices, rather than counter-cultural ones.  
Latour frames his interventions on political ecology as a speculative extrapolation and 
refinement of the practice of activists, but also deplores that it has failed to realise its theoretical 
shortcomings and the misleading ontological positions on which it has often been based. He 
does not, as Stengers does, seek to learn from devastated or marginalised positions on their 
own terms. Thus in a recent interview, Latour argues that political ecology has been 
theoretically impoverished compared with socialism and communism, whose proponents 
“have tried to rethink the entirety of Western philosophy to frame fights against inequalities 
and injustice”, but who had “Hegel to help them frame the whole circus” (Latour,  Milstein, 
Marrero-Guillamón and Rodríguez-Giralt, 2018, p. 354). He argues that political ecology has 
remained committed to an externalised vision of nature, and this is the main thing that is wrong 
with it; according to Latour this theoretical deficiency has prevented meaningful collaboration 
between environmentalists and other social movements.  
I now want to return to the passage from Haraway with which this section 
commenced. In Latour’s most recent work, enemies have come to play a central role; but he 
has always liked metaphors which make science sound like fighting. Over the past two 
decades, one of Latour’s preferred articulations for conflict between different positions has 
been the political theology of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt draws a distinction between ‘police 
actions’ where an authority is able to reassert control on the basis of established standards, and 
states of war where no such external authority exists (Dean 2006). From Schmitt, Latour draws 
the lesson that conflicts, whose participants cannot appeal to an external arbiter, should be 
understood as wars. If Schmitt’s argument is correct, writes Latour, “one can indeed say that 
the modernist civilizers never had enemies and modern history has never really witnessed a 
proper war. Even when fighting fiercely, they always deferred to the authority of an 
indisputable arbiter, of a mediator far above all possible forms of conflict: Nature and its laws, 
Science and its unified matters of fact, Reason and its way to reach agreement” (Latour 2002, 
p. 26). ‘Moderns’should be grateful to their enemies for clarifying what is at stake: from 
henceforth there is no external authority, and conflicts arising from an increasingly 
indistinguishable science and politics will be resolved through either warfare or diplomacy. 
Through this talk of war, Latour quotes from military histories, taking from them the 
lesson that wars often lead to unforeseen catastrophic consequences; he also holds up the 
example of mass mobilisation during the Cold War as a comparator for the slow pace of 
response to the New Climactic Regime (Latour 2017, p. 45). But he does not show any interest 
at all in the empirical or theoretical question of how wars have been fought, the networks of  
humans and non-humans from which armies are assembled; nor does he have any concept of 
the civilian. His claim that future wars will not resemble the wars of the past because there will 
no longer be any kind of police authority is a powerful metaphor, but it also belongs to a long 
line of claims that future wars will be utterly unrecognisable in comparison with earlier ones 
(Freedman 2017). 
It is not clear why war, as one of the master metaphors of Latour’s recent thought should 
not be subjected to the same examination as ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ are. This framing has the 
advantage for Latour that it allows him talk about a radical change in the stakes of dispute 
without committing him to any definite political position. Instead, the outcomes of the 
Schmittian state of war are, primarily, a shift in ontological perspective. This  modest 
processual hope again stands at odds with Latour’s more transformative rhetoric: 
  
To arrive unannounced among other peoples and put everything to fire and the sword 
with the aim of pacifying them in the name of a fundamental and already-constituted 
peace, is not the same thing, the same mission, with the same tension, as appearing, 
perhaps with the same violence, the same fire and the same swords, and fighting on the 
battlefield to decide which common world should be progressively pieced together 
(Latour 2002, p. 32). 
  
This passage appears to foresee a remade colonial violence, continuous with the old one but 
with its meanings transfigured by a shift in ontological perspective. But because Latour does 
not subject Schmitt’s concept of war to any kind of critical or empirical analysis, as either a 
concept or a sociotechnical activity, it is difficult to know how seriously to take such 
arguments. They use an anticipatory rhetoric to envisage changes whose material and political 
implications are never clearly articulated. By contrast, Stengers’ more cautious speculative 
approach allows her to speak in terms of possibility and becoming, without committing to the 
more prophetic registers which Latour employs.  
The darkness of this vision sits uneasily with the ebullient tone of Latour’s characteristic 
style. New wars present new “opportunities for peace”, Latour argues repeatedly: in this new 
dispensation,which is really the same as the old one, but stripped of the fantasies which allowed 
the state of war to be concealed, all sorts of new opportunities for diplomacy will arise (Latour 
2016, p. 226).  Diplomats are admirable because they are committed to open-ended processes 
rather than fixed outcomes: “The great quality of diplomats”, he writes “is that they don’t know 
for sure what are the exact and final goals—not only of their adversaries but also of their own 
people” (Latour 2002, p. 38). This means that diplomacy can be open-ended and lead to 
unforeseen outcomes; that “parties to the conflicts may, after all, be willing to alter slightly 
what they were fighting for” (p. 38). Again, diplomacy is not subjected to any kind of empirical 
or historical analysis, but he does think that they need to be ontologically careful, for “to 
behave diplomatically, when one is manipulating materials as explosive as deities, is to require 
oneself always to begin with the attributes, so as not to fight right away over the substances” 
(Latour 2016, p. 154). In other words, diplomacy will involve finding common ground on the 
basis of shared understandings of distributed agency. It is not clear how this relates to any 
previous form of diplomacy.  
   This is why Haraway deplores Latour’s use of Schmitt. The language of enmity allows for 
exciting vistas and figurations of how the world might change in response to the realisation 
that human and natural activity are now thoroughly intermeshed with one another, and always 
have been. But Latour is vague about what kinds of resistance or solidarity should emerge, and 
gleeful about the prospect of diplomacy and fighting without dwelling on what these activities 
will involve. As with Haraway’s recent work, one major shortcoming of this most generous 
and exultant of thinkers is that he has no serious account of utopian violence. 
  
 
8. Conclusion: We have often been utopian 
  
This essay has traced some of the utopian and anti-utopian currents which have informed 
history, philosophy and  sociology of science during the twentieth and early twenty first 
centuries, including the ideal of integration, the hope associated with planning, the fear of 
blueprints, the celebration of reflexivity and the place of resistant figures. Other traditions can 
of course be traced, and the treatment of the ones I have considered here is inevitably partial. 
I hope, however, that bringing these different approaches together can lead to reflections on 
the radical foundations of some aspects of HPS and STS, and also challenge the nostalgia 
which accompanies some reflections on how these perspectives fell into relative eclipse within 
the academy. In recovering past utopian positions, we should also seek to challenge them—
especially the ways in which they continue to inform our assumptions, in unexamined ways. 
I would like to draw three more general lessons. The first lesson is that utopian themes have 
played a significant, if not a central, role in HPS and STS. The longings for alternatives and 
integration, the articulation of alternative ontologies, and the attempts to develop scenarios 
traced here intertwine with attempts to develop solidarities outside the academy, and to 
understand how to relate scholarly reflection to political practice. These efforts have been 
defeated, repeatedly; and they have returned, repeatedly. In general, the form that these visions 
have taken has changed in line with wider shifts in utopian thought over the past fifty years, 
from a more copious account of change to more partial, situated and resistant modes. But the 
pace of these shifts has worked themselves out differently in different fields, and even in the 
works of individual scholars. It is thus important to distinguish between the approaches of, for 
example, Latour and Stengers, despite the kinship of their writings. With these utopian legacies 
come some views that are almost default, and deserve a more critical interrogation: when, for 
example, might reflexivity and integration impede scientific, human and non-human 
flourishing? 
The second lesson is that history has been important for imagining scientific and 
technological alternatives. Not all alternatives are utopian, but to the extent that they disturb 
the existing order, these visionscan have radical implications. Scholars have often looked to 
historical examples (such as McClintock’s science) in order to affirm that another world and 
another knowledge is, indeed, possible. They have also, like Haraway, Chang and Stengers, 
tried to articulate living relationships between the present and the past. This is part of the way 
in which some elements of HPS and STS work. Stengers also challenges us to think about the 
authority assumed by critique, including utopian challenges, and how we might shape accounts 
which allow closer encounters with the practices of others, by giving up our presumption to 
pass judgment from outside. What may follow from this is a question about how to situate the 
use and imagination of historical alternatives—when and where do scientists draw on aspects 
of the past which seem to point towards different ways of going forward, as part of their own 
practices, and when do alternatives envisaged by STS and HPS impinge on these alternative 
historical visions? Conversely, what episodes from the scientific past serve chiefly as a 
resource for people who are not natural scientists to challenge existing orders of knowledge? 
The final lesson is intended seriously, but also as a provocation. In the utopian writings 
of Otto Neurath, the sense that philosophy of science might support the explication of plans 
for different societies played a central part. Critical utopianism, by challenging the role of 
blueprints, has pulled away from this direction, favouring more reflexive and less 
representational modes of utopianism. At the same time, however, as Levitas argues, “Explicit 
alternative scenarios for the future are fundamental to any kind of democratic debate” (Levitas 
2014, p. xviii) This has been the view of much recent academic work on futures, and also the 
popular utopians mentioned in the introduction. Can HPS and STS provide these scenarios? 
Should they want to? The reception of Haraway’s story suggests some of the problems which 
can emerge when academics attempt to draw on the resources of fiction; but her desire to move 
into a fictional register also indicates an interest in specific and detailed description of what 
possible futures might look like—which are then meant to be open to collaboration and 
challenge. It is possible to imagine an STS which developed more thorough-going explicit 
alternative scenarios, and the roles which history and philosophy might play in furnishing 
episodes for this enterprise. The well-established critique of whiggism, presentism and 
triumphalism in the history of science has always been based on the claim that the meanings 
of histories of science should not be determined by the way sciences exists in the present 
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